all agency computer systems, last year Congress provided $86 million to perform Y2K updates at the Federal Aviation Administration, the Treasury Department and the Health Care Financing Administration. This fall, Congress is expected to provide another $3.25 billion in emergency funding to ensure the federal government can fully meet the Y2K challenge.

We also need to encourage companies, large and small, to meet this challenge. During congressional hearings, representatives from the private sector discussed hesitancy to disclose any information about their own Y2K progress. Companies are reluctant to work together based almost entirely on fears of potential litigation and legal liabilities. For example, in my state of Ohio, NCR, a world-wide provider of information technology solutions, has been working on Y2K solutions since 1996. NCR made valuable progress in research on its own preparedness for Y2K and in finding solutions to help other businesses prepare for the millennium. Unfortunately, they were hesitant to deliver these statements for fear that they would be sued. In order to encourage the private sector to share valuable information and experiences, these lines of communication need to be open. Congress recently passed legislation, S. 2392, to encourage companies to freely discuss potential Y2K problems, solutions, test results and readiness amongst themselves. This law will provide businesses the temporary protection from lawsuits regarding statements made about Y2K.

As the chairman of the Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition Subcommittee, I am usually reluctant to support any exemption from our antitrust laws. As a general proposition it is very important that these laws apply broadly to all sectors of the economy to protect consumers and allow businesses to operate in an environment of fair and rigorous competition. However, I do support the narrow, temporary exemption passed by Congress as a part of our overall effort to address the Y2K problem.

This exemption does not cover conduct such as price fixing or group boycotts. Even with these important limitations this antitrust exemption should provide significant protection for those who might otherwise be reluctant to pool resources and share information.

S. 2392 is crucial to opening the lines of communication between companies, particularly those in the utility and telecommunications industries, which were cited by the Senate Y2K Subcommittee as its top priority for review. This legislation will be a giant step in implementing Y2K solutions. Not only will the bill promote discussion, it will also establish a single government website for access to Y2K information.

Mr. President, both the supplemental spending and information sharing bills represent the kind of effort we need to meet the Y2K challenge. Without question, we are in an era of rapid communication and innovation, and the role computer technology plays in our daily lives is a constant reminder of this fact. Now, with this technology at risk of disrupting our lives as we usher in a new century and millennium, our ability to both communicate and to innovate will be put to the test over the next 14 months. It will take a combined effort from the public and private sector to pass this test.

FAILURE TO PASS JUVENILE CRIME LEGISLATION

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, last Friday, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, my good friend from Utah, spoke on the floor about juvenile justice legislation. He indicated that he will be urging the Majority Leader to make this issue one of the top legislative priorities in the 106th Congress. It is indeed unfortunate that the Senate has failed to consider legislation in this important area.

Improving our Nation's juvenile justice system and preventing juvenile delinquency has strong bipartisan support in Congress and in the White House. That is why I and other Democrats have introduced juvenile crime legislation both at the beginning and the end of this Congress. Within the first weeks of the 105th Congress, I joined Senator DASCHLE in introducing the ''Youth Violence, Crime and Drug Abuse Control Act of 1997,'' S. 15, and last month introduced, with the support of Senators DASCHLE, BIDEN and other Democratic members, the ''Safe Schools, Safe Streets and Secure Borders Act of 1998,'' S. 2484. That is why the Administration transmitted juvenile crime legislation, the ''Anti-Gang and Youth Violence Control Act of 1997,'' S. 362, which I introduced with Senator BIDEN on the Administration's behalf in February 1997.

Given the strong interest in this issue from both sides of the aisle, the failure of the Senate to consider juvenile crime legislation would appear puzzling. Indeed, the House passed juvenile justice legislation three times this year, when it sent to the Senate H.R. 3 on May 8, 1997, H.R. 1818 on July 15, 1997, and both these bills again attached to S. 2073 on September 15, 1998. The Senate juvenile crime bill, S. 10, was voted on by the Judiciary Committee in July 1997, and then left to languish for over a year.

The Republicans have never called up S. 10 for consideration by the full Senate. Instead, in early September they rushed to the floor with no warning and offered terms for bringing up the bill that would have significantly limited debate and amendments on the many controversial items in the bill. For example, although the substitute juvenile crime bill that the Republicans wanted to debate contained over 160 changes from the Committee-reported bill, the majority wished to limit Democratic amendments to five. This offer was unacceptable, as the Republicans well knew before they ever offered it.

We should recognize this offer for what it is: a procedural charade engaged in by the Republicans in a feeble effort to place the blame on the minority for the majority's failure to bring up juvenile justice legislation in the Senate. Nevertheless, I suggested a plan for a full and fair debate on S. 10. On September 25, 1998, I put in the record a proposal that would have limited the amendments offered by Democrats to the most controversial aspects of the bill, such as restoring the core protection for juvenile status offenders to keep them out of jail, keeping juveniles who are in custody separated from adult inmates, and ensuring adequate prevention funding.

I never heard back from the Republicans. They simply ignored my proposal, and failed to turn to this issue again on the floor of the Senate. These facts make clear that assertions about Democrats refusing proposals to limit the number of amendments to S. 10, and refusing to permit a conference on House-passed legislation, could not be farther from the truth. Indeed, no proposal to agree to a conference was ever propounded on the floor of the Senate.

During the past year, I have spoken on the floor of the Senate and at hearings on numerous occasions about my concerns with S. 10, including on November 13, 1997, January 29, 1998, April 1, 1998, June 23, 1998, and September 8, 1998. On each of those occasions, I expressed my willingness to work with the Chairman in a bipartisan manner to improve this bill. Since Committee consideration of the bill, I have continued to raise the areas of concern that went unaddressed in the Committee-reported bill. Specifically, I was concerned that the bill skimped on effective prevention efforts to stop children from getting into trouble in the first place.

Second, I was concerned that the bill would gut the core protections, which have been in place for over 20 years to protect children that come into contact with the criminal justice system and keep them out of harm's way from adult inmates, to keep status and non-offenders out of jail altogether, and to address disproportionate minority confinement.

Third, I was concerned about the federalization of juvenile crime due to S. 10's elimination of the requirement that federal courts may only get involved in prosecutions of juveniles for offenses with which the federal government has concurrent jurisdiction with the State, if the State cannot or declines to prosecute the juvenile.

Finally, I was concerned the new accountability block grant in S. 10 contained onerous eligibility requirements that would end up imposing on the States a one-size-fits-all uniform sewn-up in Washington for dealing with juvenile crime. I know many States viewed

this bill as a straight-jacket, which is why it was opposed by the National Governors' Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Association of Counties and the Council of State Governments.

Unfortunately, productive negotiations on this bill did not commence in earnest until the final days of this Congress. The fact that negotiations began at all is due in no small part to the efforts and leadership of Representatives BILL MCCOLLUM, CHARLES SCHUMER, FRANK RIGGS, BOBBY SCOTT and JOHN CONYERS. They and their staffs have worked tirelessly on this issue and to address many of the concerns that were raised about the juvenile crime legislation.

Over the past week, I have worked with Senators HATCH, SESSIONS, BIDEN, KENNEDY, KOHL, FEINGOLD and BINGAMAN, and our House counterparts, to craft bipartisan legislation that could be passed in the final days of this Congress. While our last-minute efforts to complete action on this bill were unsuccessful, I appreciate the good faith in which these bipartisan, bicameral negotiations took place and recognize the important compromises that were offered on all sides. Time ran out in this Congress to get our job done on this legislation.

I appreciate the frustration of many of my Republican colleagues about our inability to achieve consensus on juvenile justice legislation because I know that those frustrations are shared by me and my Democratic colleagues. It is unfortunate that the majority did not chose to begin these negotiations, and did not chose to start addressing the significant criticisms of this bill, until the last minutes of this Congress.

When the 106th Congress convenes, and we again turn our attention to juvenile justice legislation, my hope is that the good work we have accomplished over the last week is the starting point. If not, I fear that the 106th Congress will end up at the same place we are today: with no juvenile justice legislation to show as an accomplishment for all of us. I thank all who have been willing to make the effort in the final days, and look forward to completing this work early next year.

CBO PROJECT ANALYSES

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, at the time the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources filed its reports on H.R. 4079, to authorize the construction of temperature control devices at Folsom Dam in California, and H.R. 3687, the Canadian River Prepayment Act, the analyses from the Congressional Budget Office were not available. Those analyses have now been received. I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD for the advice of the Senate.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

H.R. 4079—An act to authorize the construction of temperature control devices at Folsom Dam in California

Summary: H.R. 4079 would authorize the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Bureau of Reclamation, to construct devices for controlling and monitoring water temperatures at Folsom Dam and certain nonfederal facilities. Temperature control devices allow water to be diverted from a higher point in the water column of a reservoir, thereby preserving cool water for fish. The act would authorize the appropriation of $7 million (in October 1997 dollars) for construction and such sums as necessary for operating, maintaining, and replacing the devices. A portion of these amounts would be repaid by water and power users in the region.

CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 4079 would result in additional outlays of $7 million over the 1999–2003 period, assuming the appropriation of the necessary amounts. H.R. 4079 would affect direct spending; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures would apply. CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 4079 would decrease direct spending by about $400,000 over the 1999–2003 period. The legislation contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would have no significant impact on the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary impact of H.R. 4079 is shown in the following table. The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 300 (natural resources and environment).

	By fiscal years, in millions of dollars—				
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION					
Estimated Authorization Level	7	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Estimated Outlays	5	1	1	(1)	(1)

[1] Less than $500,000.

Basis of estimate: For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that H.R. 4079 will be enacted by the beginning of fiscal year 1999 and that the estimated amounts necessary to implement the act will be appropriated each year.

Spending subject to appropriation

H.R. 4079 would authorize the appropriation of $5 million for constructing a temperature control device and monitoring apparatus at Folsom Dam and $2 million for constructing similar mechanisms at nearby nonfederal facilities. Those amounts are authorized in October 1997 dollars and may be adjusted to reflect inflation, but such adjustments would not be significant if funds are provided in fiscal year 1999 or 2000. Based on information provided by the bureau, CBO expects that construction at Folsom Dam would be completed in 1999 and that construction at nonfederal facilities would be completed by 2001, if the necessary appropriations are provided. CBO estimates that the annual cost of operating, maintaining, and replacing these devices over the 1999–2003 period would be negligible.

Direct spending

About $4 million of the cost of constructing the temperature control device and monitoring apparatus at Folsom Dam would be repaid by water and power users. (The costs of devices at nonfederal facilities would not be repaid.) CBO estimates that repayments would total $140,000 annually over the 2001–2030 period. (Because water and power rates are set one year in advance, there would be a one-year lag between the year the project is completed, 1999, and the year that repayment begins.)

Pay-as-you-go-considerations: The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act sets up pay-as-you-go procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or receipts. CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 4079 would affect direct spending but that there would be no significant impact in any year. Enacting this legislation would not affect governmental receipts.

Estimated intergovernmental and private sector impact: H.R. 4079 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA and would have no significant impact on the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.

Previous CBO estimate: On August 10, 1998, CBO provided an estimate for H.R. 4079, as ordered reported by the House Committee on Resources on July 29, 1998. The two versions of the legislation and their estimated costs are identical.

Estimate prepared by: Gary Brown.

Estimate approved by: Paul N. Van de Water, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

H.R. 3687—Canadian River Project Prepayment Act

Summary: H.R. 3687 would authorize prepayment by the Canadian River Municipal Water Authority of amounts due for the pipeline and related facilities of the Canadian River Project in Texas. Current law provides for conveying title for these elements to the authority once repayment is complete.

CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 3687 would slightly reduce discretionary spending, and would yield a net decrease in direct spending of $26 million over the 1999–2003 period. That near-term cash savings would be offset on a present-value basis, however, by the loss of currently scheduled payments. Because H.R. 3687 would affect direct spending, pay-as-you-go procedures would apply.

The act contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). State and local governments might incur some costs as a result of H.R. 3687's enactment, but these costs would be voluntary.

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary impact of H.R. 3687 is shown in the following table. The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 300 (natural resources and environment).

	By fiscal years, in millions of dollars—				
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
DIRECT SPENDING					
Spending Under Current law:[1]					
Estimated Budget Authority	0	0	−3	−3	−3
Estimated Outlays	0	0	−3	−3	−3
Proposed Changes:					
Estimated Budget Authority	−35	0	3	3	3
Estimated Outlays	−35	0	3	3	3
Spending Under H.R. 3687:					
Estimated Budget Authority	−35	0	0	0	0
Estimated Outlays	−35	0	0	0	0

[1] The next payment from the Canadian River Municipal Water Authority is not due until 2001.

Basis of estimate: CBO assumes that H.R. 3687 is enacted near the beginning of fiscal year 1999 and that prepayment will occur within this fiscal year. (The authority to prepay would expire 360 days after enactment.)

Direct spending

CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 3687 would result in a prepayment to the federal government of about $35 million in 1999. After prepayment, the authority would no longer make the regularly scheduled payment of $3 million a year over the 2001–2022 period.